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DECODING THE IMPOSSIBILITY DEFENSE
Daniel Yeager
I. INTRODUCTION
Impossible attempts were first officially recognized as non-criminal in
1864.' Not that they needed official recognition. Because "[t]he easiest cases
don't even arise,"2 that 1864 ruling literalized what then had to be a given: a
person whose anti-social bent poses no appreciable risk of harm is no
criminal.
Over 150 years later, scholarly output on the subject persists,' marked by
thoughtful takes on the inner and outer worlds and an odd preoccupation with
"imaginative hypotheticals" 4 like "Lady Eldon,"' a difficulty as unlikely to
arise in the experience of lawyers as it was in 1912 when Wharton cooked it
up. 6 To reassure myself the subject doesn't "smell of the lamp,"' before
undertaking this Essay I tapped "impossibility" into Westlaw, which
designated over 3,000 criminal cases as on point, 1,200 or so more recent
than 1999. From that I take that impossible attempts are not, as some courts
and commentators have insinuated, merely a professorial hobby horse.'
Instead, impossible attempts express a non-trivial tension between risktaking and harm-causing within the very real world of criminal litigation.
Impossibility also merits continued study because it seemingly began to
erode as a defense to a charge of attempt as soon as fifteen years after its 1864
discovery. 9 Now it is hornbook that impossible attempts are punishable as

2

Regina v. Collins (1864) 169 Eng. Rep. 1477.
K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.).

3 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 11.5, n.1 (2016).
4 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.07, at 399 (7th ed. 2015); see Peter
Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 524 (2008) ("[S]cholars

devote attention to a few problematic cases that are so lacking in practical importance that scholars are
obliged to invent fanciful hypotheticals to discuss them.").
Lady Eldon smuggled English lace in from the continent, taking it in error to be contraband French
lace. See Audrey Rogers, ProtectingChildren on the Internet: Mission Impossible?, 61 BAYLOR L. REV.
323, 347-48 (2009) (noting that Lady Eldon is "mental gymnastics" for first-year students).
6 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 225, n.8 (James M. Kerr ed., 11th ed. 1912).
Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1071 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adisert, J., concurring).
8 Commonwealth v. Bell, 853 N.E.2d 563, 564-65 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); see Neil P. Cohen,
Teaching Criminal Law: Curing the Disconnect, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1195, 1197-98 (2004) ("The
Criminal Law course I taught dealt with the traditional subjects, including such esoterica as impossible
attempts... . During my relatively brief tenure as a prosecutor . .. I did not encounter any impossible
attempt cases, but I did see a significant number of assault-related incidents.").
9 See Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 464, 484 n.122
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crimes.'o Specifically, "[t]hirty-seven states have explicitly eliminated
impossibility as a defense to a charge of attempt and the federal circuits that
have not done likewise have so limited the range of application of the defense
as to render it virtually a dead letter."" Beyond such rhetoric that
impossibility is no longer a defense,1 2 that it still has a place in the law of
attempt was evident in the digests and law reviews long before Graham
Hughes touted it fifty years ago as an area that repays close study. 3
Agreement that the impossibility defense has a way of rehabilitating itself
from criticism continues. What continues more precisely is a sense of a
difference between failing at larceny by picking the empty pocket of a
passerby on a sidewalk and by picking the empty pocket of a mannequin in a
department store. 14 What remains up in the air is what accounts for that
difference. Despite two absolutist positions on this-1) impossibility is a
defense to a charge of attempt; and 2) it is not a defense-we have a lingering
sense that some cases should come out one way and some another. But
because we have evolved no language to account for the difference, we live
in a state of uneasiness about it.
Here I rehearse an argument meant to help decode the impossibility
defense by "hounding down the minutiae"" of what it means to make a
mistake. I am certainly not the first to insist that the impossibility defense
lives on.16 I am, however, the first to base such a claim on the grammar or
criteria of mistakes, which can get us closer to the bottom of what makes
attempts impossible and why it matters.
Extant impossibility cases and scholarship take mistakes as a given.' 7 But
what is a mistake? Is the answer considered too obvious to mention? Kenneth
Simons, to take just one leading authority, has written 164 law-review pages

(1954).

§ 85(a), at 423, §

85(c), at 427-31 (1984

&

See PAUL H. ROBINSON, I CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES

10

Supp. | 2016).
" John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and
Liabilityfor Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (2002).
12 See John F. Preis, Note, Witch Doctors and Battleship Stalkers: The Edges of
Exculpation in

Entrapment Cases, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1869, 1896-98 n.164 (1999) (noting that factual and hybrid
impossibility, if not legal impossibility, are no longer defenses).
" See Graham Hughes, One FurtherFootnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1005,

1005 (1967).

14 See Westen, supra note 4, at 523.

15 J.L. AUSTIN, A Pleafor Excuses: The PresidentialAddress, 57 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 1, 1

(1956).
16

See e.g., Kyle S. Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt: A Proposed Revision
to the Model

Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237 (1995); Ken Levy, It's Not Too Dificult: A Plea to Resurrect the
ImpossibilityDefense, 45 N.M. L. REV. 225 (2014); Westen, supra note 4, at 523.
" See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d 69, 69-70 (Iowa 1978) (reversing trial court for failure to
adequately explain mistake of fact injury instructions).
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about mistakes of law and fact embedded in the impossibility defense,"
tossing in just once that a mistake is a sort of "perception" or "empirical
judgment" at odds with the world.19 He does not elaborate. Nor do others
engaged in like projects.20
Within the "stock hypotheticals" of impossible attempts,21 a man shoots a
22
tree stump or a corpse, each having been mistaken for a live person, or he
administers to a live person an innocuous substance he has mistaken for
poison. 23 These stick-figure hypotheticals pose whether attempted murder
has occurred. But because it is stipulatedthat each action owes to mistake,
we are told so little about what happened that of course the question is hard
to answer. Any chance of making sense of the hypotheticals is stymied by an
absence both of facts and of any concern for what can count as a mistake. My
contribution here to the considerable work of others is to locate the
impossibility defense within an actual context of human action and concern,
which is the only way we can become clear for ourselves what is a mistake
and what is not. We will find the situations in which the law deploys the
notion of mistake are not always situations in which we would find the use
of that term natural or responsive to our human need to locate mistakes in the
world.
II. EXCULPATORY MISTAKES

Our interest in mistakes, like our interest in all excuses, is in assessing our
responsibility for the harms we inflict on others. Like accidents, mistakes
excuse us for the harms we bring about unless the legislature intended "strict
liability," which is legally permissible only when the offense is not malum in
se: read, is not a pre-legal wrong. 24 In other words, when accused of doing
something a good person would not do, the accused must be given a chance

1"

Kenneth W. Simons, Ignoranceand Mistake ofCriminal Law, NoncriminalLaw, and Fact, 9 OHIo

ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2012) (57 pages); Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake of Fact or Mistake of CriminalLaw?
ExplainingandDefending the Distinction,3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 213 (2009) (35 pages); Kenneth W. Simons,
&

Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L.

CRIMINOLOGY 447 (1990) [hereinafter Simons, Mistake and Impossibility] (72 pages).
' Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, supra note 18, at 469.
20 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the Fact/Law Distinction:

An Essay in Memory of Myke Balyes, 12 L. & PHIL. 33 (1993); Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and
Formalism: What Happens if We Define Mistake of Law?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 507 (2001).
21 Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: DecriminalizingHarmlessAttempts, 53 OHIO ST.

LJ. 1057, 1102 (1992).
22 See Mihailis E. Diamantis, CorporateCriminalMinds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2049,2070 (2016)
(describing the corpse hypothetical); Keedy, supra note 9, at 467 (describing the stump hypothetical).
23 Hasnas, supra note 11, at 2 n.1.
24 See Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense ofMistake ofFact About Consent in

Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 840-41 (1996).
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to elaborate the factual background of the incident. It follows that accusations
of being a "common thief' 25 (a pre-legal wrong) 26 or that threaten lengthy
prison sentences (a proxy for a pre-legal wrong) 27 oblige courts to hear the
accused's story about how the action misfired. In the telling of those stories,
mistakes of fact generally excuse the accused, whereas mistakes of law
generally do not.2 8 Likewise, with general-intent offenses, mistakes must be
reasonable to get the accused off the hook, whereas with specific-intent
offenses, so-called unreasonable mistakes suffice.2 9
For example, self-defenders who unnecessarily but reasonably respond
forcibly to perceived threats are mistaken about facts, which, if they were as
perceived by self-defenders, would render the self-defensive actions
noncriminal.30 The same can be said of accused rapists,31 whose mistake
about the fact of consent negates the wrongfulness (though not harmfulness)
of the act.32 And when age is an element of a crime, as in sex with a minor, a
mistake of fact-taking a minor for an adult-excuses the accused.33
An illustration of a plea of mistake of fact is the Arkansas Supreme
Court's ruling in Flippo v. State.34 Robert L. Flippo, Jr. and his son Bobby
were hunting out of season in the woods of Lawrence County, Arkansas
where, in the poor visibility of dusk, Bobby fatally shot Roy Ralph Sharp, a
225-pound man whom Bobby took for a deer from 140 yards away.35
Evidence suggested the fatal shot ricocheted off a low branch obscuring
Sharp, whose death was hastened by the Flippos' delay in summoning help.36
Properly understood, Bobby's defense in his manslaughter trial was that he
shot Sharp by mistake. Concluding that Bobby's aim was good, but that he

25 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 251 (1961)
(Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
26 See generally Andrew Comford, Preventive
Criminalization, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 16-20
(2015) (discussing pre-legal wrongs).
27 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1994).
28 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1,
*27 ("For a mistake in point of Law, which
every person of discretion ... is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort of defense.").
29 See People v. Russell, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 263, 270-72 (Ct. App. 2006), abrogatedon other grounds
by People v. Covarrubias, 378 P.3d 615 (Cal. 2016).
30 See Commonwealth v. Scott, 73 A.3d 599, 603-05 (Pa. 2013).
31 See People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1347 (Cal. 1975) (reversing for trial court's failure to
instruct on mistake of fact in rape case where consent was plausible).
32 See id at 1344-46; Thaddeus M. Pope, Balancing
Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The
Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REv. 419, 452 n. 145 (2000) (discussing how not all harm
entails wrong and not all wrong entails harm).
" See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 678 (Cal. 1964).
34 523 S.W.2d 390, 391-92 (Ark. 1975).
35 Id
36 Id. at 392-93.
3 Id. at 391, 393.
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aimed at and shot an improvident target, the jury convicted him for his gross
negligence in hunting out of season from considerable distance when "not
sure of his target."" Simply put, Bobby's plea of mistake was rejected.
Another way of saying this is that while Sharp might have been taken for a
39
deer, he was not shot "by mistake." For if he had been, there would be
nothing to do but excuse Bobby for the killing.
Bobby's plea was based on a mistake about a fact-whether Sharp was
man or deer.40 Absent a favorable, authoritative pronouncement of law in
force before the act in question, mistakes of law are entertained as excuses
4
only if the statute is specifically designed to that end. ' An example of such
a statute is in Cheek v. United States, where an American Airlines pilot
argued he did not "willfully evade taxes" because he owed no taxes, given
his baseless belief that the Internal Revenue Code did not treat wages as
income.42 Although mistake or ignorance of law is normally no excuse, in
this case Congress had built the excuse into the offense by requiring not just
43
a failure to pay tax, but a willful failure, which could occur only with
Cheek's knowledge of his obligation to pay tax. Had Congress intended
otherwise, the statute would refer merely to a failure to pay tax, not a willful
failure.44 The Supreme Court agreed, "as incredible as such
45
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be." The source of
Cheek's beliefs? A group of lawyers, who conducted seminars denouncing
the federal tax system as unconstitutional and declaring wages as nonincome. 46 The high court's solution was to order a new trial at which the trial
court was barred from imposing a reasonableness requirement on Cheek's
47
beliefs about the Internal Revenue Code.

a 15-year-old boy with a red
38 Id. at 393 (citing State v. Green, 229 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1951) (taking
hat for either a bear or a "three-point buck" at 102 feet) (citing State v. Newberg, 278 P. 568 (Or. 1929)
(taking a man on horseback for a deer at 125 feet))).
39 Id.
40

id.

" See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947-48 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (analyzing mistake of law as
it relates to public policy). Because theft involves property known to be that of another, it is excused if the
accused takes under an erroneous claim of right based on permission, gift, or abandonment. KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 514.020(1) (West 2018); cf Picotte v. Mills, 203 S.W. 825, 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918)
(holding that ownership is mixed question of law and fact).
42 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991).
43 Id. at 200.
4 Id
4 Id at 203-04.
" Id at 195-96.
" On remand, after the pro se Cheek filed eccentric pre-trial motions, see United States v. Cheek, No.
87 Cr 161, 1991 WL 287034 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1991), his subsequent re-conviction was upheld by the
Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 1993). Cheek was sentenced to
366 days in prison, which led American Airlines to deny him a leave of absence, instead firing him (after

364

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 56:

Although Flippo and Cheek are very different in one being about fact, one
about law, that distinction conceals what they have in common. Notably
absent in both Flippo and Cheek is any consideration of why each believed
what they did: who would take a man for a deer at 140 yards, or at any
distance for that matter? Where were the target's telltale antlers, tail, and
spindly legs? And if wages aren't income, then what are they? How can a
pilot earn a big salary for two decades and continue to believe his wages
aren't income, even after repeatedly litigating the issue without success, once
suffering Rule 11 sanctions to boot? 8
III. THE CONCEPT OF MISTAKE AND ITS LIMITS

Mistakes involve the idea of a wrong alternative-taking one thing for
another or taking one tack rather than another.
You have a donkey, so have 1, and they graze in the same field. The day
comes when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a bead on
it, fire: the brute falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim, and find to my horror
that it is your donkey. I appear on your doorstep with the remains and saywhat? "I say, old sport, I'm awfully sorry. I've shot your donkey by
accident?" Or "by mistake?" Alternatively, I go to shoot my donkey as
before, draw a bead on it, fire- but as I do so, the beasts move, and to my
horror yours falls. Again the scene on the doorstep-what do I say, "by
mistake" or "by accident"?4 9
With accidents, something befalls ("I didn't mean to shoot a donkey-any
donkey"-or "that was not the donkey I was aiming at"). With mistakes, you
take the wrong one when you have both the competence and commitment to
take the right one ("I meant to shoot that donkey, but thought it was mine,
not yours"). This last qualification is most important and most frequently
overlooked in published decisions.
Neither Cheek nor Flippo made a mistake, even though both took one
thing for another. If getting things right is unlikely, guesswork, or random,
then getting them wrong is not by mistake. Only if you have knowledge in

20 years on the job) for his imminent unavailability to fly. See Cheek v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 94
C 5763, 1995 WL 115510, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 1995), aff'd, 89 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied
519 U.S. 993 (1996). Cheek lost a suit to get his job back, served six months in prison followed by three
more in a Salvation Army half-way house in Chicago, and never worked for American again, a disposition
evidently justified by the airline's collective-bargaining agreement with its pilots. See id.
4 See Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1987) (reducing sanction from $11,500
to $5,000,
while adding on another $1,500 for bringing a frivolous appeal).
49 AuSTIN, supra note 15, at II n.4.
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the first place can your knowledge fail and count as a mistake as opposed to
a wrong belief owing to something-carelessness, recklessness, fantasy,
delusion-other than mistake. When you make a mistake, you mean to do
exactly what you do, at least to a point. It is just that you misinterpret your
situation: you take someone else's property for yours, a minor for an adult,
silence for consent, a harmless prank for a deadly threat.
[Sluppose the order is "Right turn" and I turn left: no doubt the sergeant
will insinuate that my attention was distracted, or that I cannot distinguish
my right from my left-but it was not and I can, this was a simple, pure
mistake. As often happens. Neither I nor the sergeant will suggest that there
was any accident, or any inadvertence either."o
A mistake can be made only by someone who could have gotten it right, tried
to get it right, but failed-not by someone who can get it right only randomly
or cares little about getting it right. If our unfortunate soldier really didn't
know his left from his right, then his turning left cannot be something he did
"by mistake." Again, if you tell me "fetch my umbrella," and on seeing
several in the designated area I grab an umbrella clueless as to which is yours,
I am not mistaken if it turns out to be someone else's.
Two criteria for the correct deployment of our concept of mistake seem
essential. First, for me to fetch the wrong umbrella by mistake, I would need
a basis for knowing which one is yours. If I am merely guessing, then mistake
drops out as a description of what goes wrong. Thus, it would be eccentric
for me to say "I made a mistake" after guessing the wrong lottery numbers.
When success is only random, mistake is never the explanation of the
unhappy outcome.
Second, I must have a commitment to getting things right. Even if I have
reason to know which umbrella is yours, if I grab just any old umbrella, then
you might have been mistaken to rely on me to fetch it for you by taking me
for considerate and careful. But my lack of commitment to take the right one
precludes my explaining that I have taken the wrong umbrella by mistake. I
cannot fail at something at which I have not even tried.
Still, we must not be too finicky in establishing the criteria of mistakes,
lest nothing would qualify and the word would cease to have any specific
application in the world. An example of a too finicky notion of mistake is
deployed by the sophist Thrasymachus, who challenges Socrates:
[D]o you call a man who makes mistakes about the sick a doctor because of
the very mistake he is making? Or a man who makes mistakes in calculation

50

Id at 26 n.15.
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a skilled calculator, at the moment he is making a mistake, in the very sense
of his mistake? I suppose rather that this is just our manner of speakingthe doctor made a mistake, the calculator made a mistake, and the
grammarian. But I suppose that each of these men, insofar as he is what we
address him as, never makes mistakes. Hence, in precise speech,. . . none
of the craftsmen makes mistakes. The man who makes mistakes makes them
on account of a failure in knowledge and is in that respect no craftsman. So
no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes mistakes at the moment when he is
ruling, although everyone would say that the doctor made a mistake and the
ruler made a mistake. 5
To Thrasymachus, know-how fails whenever a mistake is made.52 When
know-how fails, he goes on, then the activity to which the know-how pertains
ceases to occur.53 The craftsman (doctor, calculator, grammarian, ruler) no
longer "is what we address him as" when he makes a mistake because if he
really is a craftsman, then his knowledge will never fail. 54 Because on that
account knowledge is infallible, when you make a mistake you cannot be
acting "on the basis of your knowledge."
On that account, someone who is not trained in medicine cannot make a
medical mistake (thus the hilarity of the Sprite soft drink commercial that
asks whether you would want a pro basketball player operating on you). 6
Someone who is trained in medicine, contrariwise, cannot not make a
medical mistake because medicine is not occurring at the moment of the lapse
since failures of knowledge are false to the activity itself ("you call yourself
a doctor?")."
Such an account misreads mistakes in the opposite direction from Flippo
and Cheek. In those and other cases, all failures of knowledge, of whatever
kind, are counted uncritically as mistakes." For Plato's Thrasymachus, no
failure of knowledge is counted as a mistake, since knowledge by its very
nature can never fail." Neither of these two extremes can be right. Mistakes
are made only by competent agents, whose successes depend on the
possibility of mistakes. That is, mistakes are, and must be, inherent in any
" PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 18 (Allan Bloom, trans., Basic Books
2d ed. 1991) (c. 380 B.C.E).

52

See id.

53

Id.

54 id.
56

See DANIEL YEAGER, J.L. AUSTIN AND THE LAW: EXCULPATION
AND THE EXPLICATION OF

RESPONSIBILITY 75 (2005).
17

5

See id.
See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); Flippo v. State, 523 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Ark.

1975).
" See PLATO, supra note 51.

2018]

Decoding the Impossibility Defense

367

successful enterprise. Despite what Thrasymachus may say, we do "call a
man who makes mistakes about the sick a doctor because of the very mistake
he is making." 60 Mistakes must be possible or it would mean nothing to refer
to a surgery (or anything for that matter) as "well done," "successful," or
"correct." Incompetent or indifferent agents do not make mistakes. 6 ' instead,
they fumble around, their failures predictable and their successes dumb luck.
Indeed, that only a competent, committed agent may make a mistake explains
why it is such a good excuse.
Although mistakes are by definition reasonable, lawyers see the matter
differently, chalking up all wrong beliefs to mistakes, calling some
62
reasonable and the rest unreasonable. Under such a view, unreasonable
mistakes fully excuse, inter alia, attempt, theft, and burglary, and can
partially excuse murder.6 ' According to the Model Penal Code, unreasonable
64
mistakes are at worst reckless and at best negligent. In other words, actions
based on faulty, poorly formed beliefs are partially excused under the Code.
The residue of the action-that which is not excused-is a criticism of the
agent's belief itself. As a result, a killing done in the unreasonable belief that
it was necessary would not be murder, but manslaughter (if the mistake was
5
reckless) or negligent homicide (if the mistake was negligent).
Significantly, no Code text or commentary contains a single example of
an unreasonable mistake. 6 There is an example in a footnote borrowed from
Glanville Williams, who identifies the self-inflicted condition of intoxication
and any other "abnormal mental state" as the "only common situation in
67
This, even though
which a person makes an unreasonable mistake."
8
offers no
Williams
defense.
separate
extant,
an
already
is
intoxication
69
explanation.
further
In California, which has not adopted the Model Penal Code, an
unreasonable mistake of fact is

60

Id.

61

See YEAGER, supranote 56 ("The entire idea of a success, however, depends on the possibility of

a mistake.").
62 See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining CriminalLiability: The Model
PenalCode and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 681, 725-32 (1983).
61 See, e.g., People v. Braslaw, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 584-86 (Ct. App. 2015).
64 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210, explanatory note (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
61 Id. § 3.09, n.10.
- Id. §§ 3.02(2), 3.04(1), 3.09(2); see also Robinson & Grail, supra note 62, at 725-32 (discussing
unreasonable mistakes while providing no examples).
67 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.09(2), n.10 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see also
YEAGER, supra note 56, at 38, 172 n.29.
68 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.08 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
69 Id. § 3.09(2), n.10.

368

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE L4 WREVIEW

[Vol. 56:

predicated upon a negligent perception of facts, not, as in the case of a
delusion, a perception of facts not grounded in reality. A person acting
under a delusion is not negligently interpreting actual facts; instead, he or
she is out of touch with reality. That may be insanity, but it is not a mistake
as to any fact. 70
In fact, no state recognizes delusion as a defense except within a claim of
insanity.7 1 When a misguided belief is not correctible by more information,
the actions that follow are based on delusion or fantasy, not mistake. Illusions
can be the basis of mistakes; delusions cannot. 72 Examples of illusions
include when a ventriloquist's dummy appears to talk, amputees feel pain in
lost limbs, or a straight stick looks bent in water. In these cases, it is not that
something unreal is conjured up. That would be a delusion, as in a delusion
of persecution or of grandeur. Because delusions are without foundation, they
are a much more serious matter. 7 3 Something is wrong-wrong with the
person who has them.74 That deluded persons are impervious to more
information is what makes delusions so serious. There is nothing wrong with
someone who falls for an optical illusion. It is public, anyone can see it, and
we can develop procedures for testing it.75 Because "[w]e are not ... quasiinfallible beings, who can be taken in only where the avoidance of mistake is
completely impossible," 76 if we are not to be taken in, we need to be on guard.
But it is no use to tell the sufferer from delusions to be on guard. He needs to
be cured.
Even after separating the excuse of mistake from the excuse of delusion,
borderline cases remain. For example, ghosts may be conjured up in the mind
(delusion) or they may be just a giving-in to shadows, reflections, or a trick
of the light (illusion). So too can we fairly characterize a mirage as either
invented by the crazed brain of a thirsty and exhausted traveler or as an
instance of atmospheric refraction, whereby something below the horizon
appears to be above it. 7 7
If a defendant "who makes a factual mistake misperceives the objective
circumstances," while a "delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced

70 People. v. Mejia-Lenares, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 404, 414-15 (Ct. App.
2006).
" See People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 955 (Cal. 2014); People v. Gregory, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776,
796-98 (Ct. App. 2002).
72 See J.L. AuSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 22-23 (1962).
7
See id at 21-23.
74 See id at 23-24.
7
See id at 20-23.
76

Id. at 52.

n See id. at 20-32.
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from the circumstances," 78 what, then, is objectively verifiable in the
unreasonable mistake? If someone "who misjudges the external
circumstances may show that mental disturbance"-not amounting to
79
insanity-"contributed to the mistaken perception of a threat," what lies
between the non-excuse of delusion and the operative excuse of "mental
disturbance?" It makes only misleading sense to state that such "persons
operating under a mistake of fact are reasonable people who have simply
8
Indeed, this explication of such a
made an unreasonable mistake."
which if not just a re-description of
vibe,
otherworldly
an
has
phenomenon
81
delusion, is hard to make sense of.

Unsurprisingly, a solid example of an unreasonable mistake, or what
82
Jerome Hall dubbed "extreme mistake," has yet to show up anywhere. Even
83
unrepresentative examples are few. Those include a home-invader
"defending" himself therein by killing a random 79-year-old woman with a
claw hammer in the presence of police-a self-authenticating instance of
delusion, not of a reasonable person lapsing into unreasonably "making a
mistake."84 The home-invader could not possibly have justifiably taken his
victim as a real threat. Also held out as unreasonable mistakes are cases better
understood as straight-up provocation (as where a defendant in mutual
85
combat over the victim's wife resorts to a fatal stabbing) or perfect selfdefense (as where years of abuse evidenced by Battered Women's Syndrome
leads the defendant to shoot her sleeping abuser-husband on the very evening
he had threatened to kill her)." No wonder New York repudiated the
87
unreasonable-mistake category in its version of the Model Penal Code.
Mistakes, after all, are not merely psychological, internal events in-which
some are reasonable and some are not. Instead, they are all by nature
reasonable lapses, which occur, are elaborated, and are responded to in the
public, observable world. Adherence to this insight is crucial to a process by

People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 960 (Cal. 2014).
Id. at 966-67.
so People. v. Mejia-Lenares, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 404,416-17 (Ct App. 2006).
to a mental affliction not
8' An illustration of a claim of unreasonable mistake purporting to owe
amounting to insanity is People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949).
82 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 592 (2d ed. 1960).
cases of unreasonable
3 See People v. Gregory, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 795 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing
plea).
guilty
schizophrenic's
upholding
while
mistake
* People v. Hardin, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262, 268 (Ct. App. 2000).
8 See Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1998).
8 See DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1060, 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2001).
7 See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 49-50 (N.Y. 1986); see also People v. Reese, 815 N.W.2d 85,
98-99 n.62 (Mich. 2012) (purporting to follow Vermont and New Jersey in repudiating imperfect selfdefense).
8

7
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which mistakes are assessed, a process by which human action can be
understood, and as a result, responded to.
IV. INCULPATORY MISTAKES

'

While so far here our interest in mistakes has been in their capacity for
excusing harm-causing action, mistakes also have point in converting
harmless action into punishable instances of criminal attempt. Criminal
attempts are punishable even though the intended crime is unconsummated."
Although the intended crime fails because in one way or another the
attempter gets caught before he can pull the crime off,89 the attempter remains
partially on the hook, though less than if he had succeeded. Failure,
accordingly, is a partial excuse, which (for the most part) mitigates
punishment below that meted out for the successful offense. 90 Attempts are
said to be impossible when a criminal's efforts fail due to factors apartfrom
getting caught. That is, an attempt is impossible when the means selected for
its execution are so shabby that we could have predicted the failure of the
criminal effort even before the plan was put into action. 9
For example, murder is not impossible when the accused intentionally
shoots a victim who survives through the intervention of life-saving surgery.
Nor is theft impossible when a victim fights off the accused, who obtains no
property. Although a thief cannot pick an empty pocket, if the thief does not
know the pocket is empty, does that mean he has not attempted theft? No, the
would-be thief is still punishable for attempted theft.92 Next time, the
argument runs, he may figure out who has money and who does not. Thus,
for deterrence purposes he should this time be only partially excused for
having fallen short.93 The case of the failed pickpocket therefore is not a case
of impossibility.94

8 See R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 221-28, 363-74 (1996); Douglas Husak, The
Nature and
JustifiabilityofNonconsummate Offenses, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 151, 151-52, 178-82 (1995).
" Cf Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARv. J. LEGIS. 1, 60-61 n.303 (1989) ("The
elements of attempted tax evasion are the same as those for tax evasion itself, combined only with the fact
that the actor was caught.").
9 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 2011); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official
Draft 1962).
9' See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 451
(1990).
92 See, e.g., People v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Cal. 1961); Commonwealth
v. McDonald, 50
Mass. 365, 367-68 (1850). But see Regina v. Collins, (1865) 169 Eng. Rep. 1477, 1478 (holding that no
attempted larceny occurred when defendant put his hand into an empty pocket), overruled by Regina v.
Ring, (1892) 17 Cox C.C. 491, 66 L.T. (NS) 306.
9 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal
Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1217-18
(1985).
9 Some have taken the position that after the fact, all attempts
may be dubbed "impossible." E.g,
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But what if someone intends to commit rape or murder, but fails because
95
his would-be rape or murder victim is already dead? Or his would-be
murder victim is alive but sleeping in another room when the "murderer"
96
shoots through a window, striking a pillow, which is taken for the victim?
And what about someone who intends to take a deer out of season, but the
deer turns out to be a stuffed decoy?97
The answer to each question posed above is embedded first in an answer
98
a
to prior question: is the defendant trying to commit what really is a crime?
If it is, then his failure-which manifests nothing redeeming about him-is
something for which he deserves only partial credit: bad intention, lucky
result. If he meant to rape or shoot a dead person (not a live one), shoot a
pillow (not an enemy), or take a stuffed deer (not a real one) out of season,
then he is not attempting anything.99 He is violating or shooting a corpse,
shooting a pillow, or taking a stuffed deer, actions whose criminality, if any,
has nothing to do with rape, murder, or preservation of deer from overzealous
hunters.
Even if defendant owns up to having tried to commit what really is a
crime, there must-because of the limits of what it means to fail due to a
mistake-be some instances where he should get off scot-free. Those limits
explain how the term "impossibility" insinuated itself into the law of attempt:
blame has no place when the prohibited harm never had a chance to occur.
As such, an impossible plan (if plan there be) lacks the proximity to success
that justifies a conviction of attempt. Success is impossible when these
would-be thieves, rapists, murderers, and scofflaw hunters go about things in
such an unlikely way as to make their failure the inevitable upshot of delusion
or fantasy, not mistake."'0 They give us doubt about whether they intended to
commit a crime or take the requisite "substantial"" or "direct but
ineffectual"10 2 step toward its completion. Though they well may need some
sort of reprogramming, because they are too disconnected from reality to

Alexander, supranote 20, at 45; J.H. Beale, Jr., CriminalAttempts, 16 HARV. L. REv. 491,496-97 (1903).
9' See Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 912-15 (Nev. 1996) (holding that sexual assault presupposes a
live victim), overruled on other grounds by Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16 (Nev. 2004); People v.
Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (N.Y. 1977) ("Whatever else it may be, it is not murder to shoot a dead
body.").
* See State v. Mitchell, 71 S.W. 175, 177 (Mo. 1902).
* See State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
9 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW

§ 3.3,

at 178 (1978).

' See Levy, supranote 16, at 254-57.
'

See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES

§ 5.01,

at 314-15 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official

Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (calling "the relative appropriateness of means to end" an "important
aspect of the impossibility problem").
'ot MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(l)(c), at 81 (Am. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
1o2 People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 701, 704 (Cal. 1983).
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have "made a mistake," they are not to be dealt with in the same way we deal
with fully responsible agents who barely fall short of the harms they
threaten.'0 o
For example, what are the conditions under which someone could think a
decoy deer is a real deer? A convincing decoy deer in the woods staged there
by the game warden should lead to the conviction of someone who shoots at
it of attempting to take a deer out of season:
The State's evidence shows that conservation agents, about two weeks
before the alleged offense, had procured the hide of a 2/2 year old doe which
had been killed by an automobile in Pulaski County. They had taken it to a
taxidermist, who soaked it to soften it, stuffed it with excelsior and boards,
inserted rods in the legs so it would stand upright and used the doe's skull
in the head part of the hide so it would hold its former shape. For eyes,
which had not been preserved, two small circular pieces of scotchlight
reflector tape of a 'white to amber color', had been placed over the eyeless
04
sockets.1

The Missouri statute which conservation agents sought to enforce
criminalized unauthorized pursuit, taking, killing, possession, or disposing of
all wildlife, not just deer.' In fact, defendants were in search of a wolf they
saw run across a road they took en route to a frog-hunting expedition.0 6 Thus
they attempted to take a wolf out of season by shooting at a decoy deer that
they took-on these facts justifiably-for a wolf.'o7 But move the decoy deer
to the end of a grocery-store aisle or any other place where deer are unlikely
to appear, or lower the quality of the decoy so that it looks fake from any
distance, and a conviction of attempt becomes manifestly absurd.os
Of course, the deer was not in a grocery-store aisle, but staged in a place
and manner where anyone might be taken in and mistake it for live, off-limits
wildlife. This makes it all the more remarkable that Guffey's conviction of
attempt was reversed. To the appellate court, Guffey's project was not an
illegal attempt to take protected wildlife, but a perfectly legal taking of an
unprotected stuffed deer by way of a shotgun blast.' 09 Because by his own
account Guffey took the stuffed decoy for alive, it is hard to locate the

o0 Hasnas, supra note 11, at 41.
* State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
o0 Id. (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 252.040 (West 1945)).
`6
07

Id. at 154.

Id.
Cf FLETCHER, supra note 98, § 3.3, at 151-52 (discussing that attempt liability in Guffey should
turn on "how deceptive the dummy was").
09 See Guffey, 262 S.W.2d at 156.
0`
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appellate court's ruling within any notion of attempt, impossible or
otherwise.' 10
As for shooting a pillow, we would need thorough knowledge of the
episode: did the enemy really resemble a pillow? In the actual case, where
Newton Mitchell's conviction of attempted murder of John Warren was
upheld by Missouri's high court, Mitchell, who had known Warren at least
twenty years, had at one time boarded at Warren's house where the attempt
occurred, thus educating himself on the layout."' Moreover, when he shot
twice through the window at the downstairs bed (one shot striking the pillow,
the other the dresser), Mitchell was unaware that Warren, who had seen
Mitchell and another man skulking around his grounds, had taken the
precaution of retiring to the upstairs where his wife and children slept.112 Plus,
Mitchell had a well-publicized motive for the attack: he fancied Warren's
wife, whom he had pledged, apparently without encouragement, to extricate
113
There is nothing impossible
from her marriage by any means necessary.
about that attempt.
J.L. Austin once put to students in a seminar at Harvard: "if a man hacks
away with an axe at a pile of logs under the bedclothes, thinking it to be a
man in his bed, isn't this attempted murder, despite the fact that the courts
hold that it is not?" 1 4 Austin's question was rhetorical. After all, elsewhere
he criticized a judge whose instructions to the jury made the defendant, by
comparison, stand out as an "evident master of the Queen's English.""' As
for the judge,
-

"he probably manages to convey his meaning somehow or other. Judges
seem to acquire a knack of conveying meaning, and even carrying
conviction, through the use of a pithy Anglo-Saxon which sometimes has
literally no meaning at all. Wishing to distinguish the case of shooting at a
post in the belief that it was an enemy, as not an "attempt," from the case of
picking an empty pocket in the belief that money was in it, which is an
"attempt," the judge explains that in shooting at the post "the man is never
on the thing at all."' 16

no See Levy, supranote 16, at 258 ("Guffey... is deeply flawed.").
State v. Mitchell, 71 S.W. 175, 176-78 (Mo. 1902).
112 Id. at 176.
11

Id. at 177-78.

11 George Pitcher, Austin: A PersonalMemoir, in ESSAYS ON J.L. AUSTIN 17, 20 (1973); cf JAMES
FITZ-JAMES STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 41 (5th ed. 1894) ("If A, mistaking a log of wood

for B, and intending to murder B, strikes the log of wood with an axe, A has not attempted to murder B.").
"5

AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 23.

"1 Id at 23 n.12 (emphasis added); cf Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 770 (Mass. 1897)
(Holmes, J.) (referring to "the classic instance of shooting at a post supposed to be a man" as no attempt).
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Austin is right: the expression may be meaningless at the literal level, but the
judge does manage to get his point across somehow. What would make the
man take a post for an enemy, anyway? Without good grounds for taking the
one for the other, the man "is never on the thing at all," the "thing" being the
successful shooting of an enemy, a risk so remote that the man is never "on"
it. His means (shooting at a post) are so poorly selected for the desired ends
(shooting a man) that success is too unlikely from the get-go to treat the
project as a serious attempt. There is something wrong with him, not with
what he saw; he is not mistaken (missing a bit of information), but delusional
(at odds with reality). Before we could consider this shooting an attempted
murder, we would need to know more about the incident, more than the stickfigure sketch that Austin-a lover of facts-gave us." 7 Only then could we
be in a position to say that the man had a basis for taking the post for an
enemy; only then could we be in a position to say that in shooting at the post
"by mistake" did he attempt to kill a man.
Another way of saying this is that we can imagine situations in which
shooting a post would be an attempt, just as we can imagine situations in
which shooting a stuffed deer (in, say, the grocery store) would not be an
"attempt to take a deer." For example, shooting a bare post sticking in the
ground from three feet is not an attempt to commit murder, though it may
conceivably be an attempt to commit murder to shoot a very realistic
scarecrow from 150 yards. What we need is a process for distinguishing the
one from the other.
And what would be the conditions under which one could take a dead
person for a live one? Narrow indeed, such as when the would-be killer,
without checking for signs of life, shoots a man in the head with a .25 caliber
bullet a few minutes after the man had died from shots to the chest by another
person with a .38.18
But how, exactly, could someone sexually penetrate a dead person, taken
for alive? Consider in this vein United States v. Thomas, where McClellan (a
Navy airman, age nineteen) began dancing at a bar with a young woman he
had just met when she promptly collapsed on the dance floor, dead from
"acute interstitial myocarditis," a heart disease." 9 With help from Thomas (a
Navy airman, age twenty) and Abruzzese (a Navy airman, age eighteen),
McClellan loaded the woman in his car, where he recommended they violate

"' For example, in Donald Siegel's 1979 film Escapefrom Alcatraz, lifer Frank Morris (played by
Clint Eastwood) masked his prison escape by arranging his bedding, replete with papier-milch head, in a
way that justifiably persuaded the night guard peering into the cell with a flashlight that Morris was asleep
therein. ESCAPE FROM ALCATRAZ (Paramount Pictures 1979).

".. See People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (N.Y. 1977).
119 32 C.M.R. 278, 280 (C.M.A. 1962).
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20
her because she "was just drunk" and "would never know the difference."l
After each took his exploitive turn therein, McClellan and Thomas dropped
1 21
off Abruzzese at the USO before taking the woman to a gas station, where
22
an attendant called police, who arrived soon after and declared her dead.1
Because evidence indicated she had died on the dance floor, rape was
precluded. 123 Convictions of attempted rape, however, were upheld on the
ground that defendants took the deceased for alive when they penetrated
her.' 24
In two opinions taking up twenty-two pages in the Court Martial Reports,
the only allusion to what led defendants to think the deceased was alive is the
coroner's remark that rigor mortis had not set in before the multiple
penetrations. 125 That offhand remark, however, is a weak basis for concluding
that defendants made a mistake about life and death. Can the line between
the two states be that fine? The whole thing seems fishy, too fantastic to count
12 6
as a mistake. As "sordid and revolting a picture" of human action as it is,
Thomas does not bespeak an attempt, not without more than the scant factual
development that the court provides.
Violating a corpse is a perversion quite apart from anything like real rape.
In fact, someone who violates a corpse very likely does so because the person
27
is dead ("and I will kill thee, and love thee after").1 Such an action should
provoke negative reaction sure enough, but not the same as to someone who
has put himself to commit rape and failed due to, say, resistance on the
12 8
would-be survivor's part.

One could conceivably take a barely dead person for a barely live person
on facts like those of Doyle v. State, where three men had intercourse with a
profoundly intoxicated twenty-year-old woman, who then threatened to
accuse them of rape before being kidnapped to an area outside Las Vegas and
murdered. 1 29 Either just before or just after she expired from being choked,
beaten, and smashed in the face with a brick, a four-inch twig was inserted in

Id.
Abruzzese flipped, testifying for the prosecution in exchange for dropped charges. See id.
id.
123 Id at 280-81.
124 Id. at 280-81, 292.
125 Id at 280.
126 Id.
127 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO 5.2.18-.19 (David Bevington ed., New York: Bantam 1988)
120

121
122

(1622).

1211 E.g., State v. Martinez, 230 P. 379, 383 (N.M. 1924); cf Waters v. State, 234 A.2d 147, 153-54
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (upholding attempted-rape conviction of 80-year-old who doubted his capacity
to achieve erection).
91 P.3d 16
129 921 P.2d 901, 906-07 (Nev. 1996), overruledon othergrounds by Kaczmarek v. State,
(Nev. 2004).
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her rectum.1 3 0 To conspiracy, kidnapping, and murder charges was
consequently added sexual assault, Doyle's conviction of which was reversed
for lack of proof as to whether penetration with the foreign object occurred
before death.' 31 Although Nevada is among those states that condition rape
on a live victim,132 the state high court noted in dictum that felony murder
may be predicated on attempted rape, which may lie when a would-be rapist
justifiably takes a barely dead victim for alive.1 33
This distinction between earnest and stillborn gestures-between failures
owing to mistake (attempts) and delusion (non-attempts)-is what the Model
Penal Code trades on when reasoning that attempt law should not punish
persons who demonstrate insufficient "dangerousness." 34 For the Code
drafters, "[t]he innocuous character of the particular conduct becomes
relevant only if the futile endeavor itself indicates a harmless personality, so
that immunizing the conduct from liability would not result in exposing
society to a dangerous person.""' The Code cites "black magic" (aka
voodoo) as a means that indicates non-dangerousness,1 3 6 at once
acknowledging that "it is by no means clear that those who make
unreasonable mistakes will not be potentiallydangerous."1 37 Indeed, anyone
out of touch enough to take just any old pillow for a person may in fact be
dangerous.13 8 Dangerous or not, no progress can be made by declaring, as
many do, the "black magic" scenario a mistake.1 39
Black magic has nonetheless become a "stock example" of the staying
power of the impossibility defense, despite the universally-held official

Id. at 905-07.
Id. at 912-15.
132 Id. at 912-13 n.6. For rulings that the death of
the victim prior to penetration does not necessarily
preclude a conviction of rape, see People v. Gomez, 959 N.E.2d 1178, 1194 (111. App. Ct. 2011) and State
v. Collins, 585 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("[The fact that the victim may have been dead
when the sexual conduct occurred does not, in itself, lessen defendant's culpability herein, nor does the
state have to prove in this case, as an element of the offense of rape, that the victim was alive when sexual
conduct occurred.").
133 Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 914 (Nev. 1996) (citing
NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (1995)),
overruled on othergrounds by Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16 (2004). But cf Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430,
435 (Nev. 2007) ("Robbery does not support felony murder where the evidence shows that the accused
kills a person and only later forms the intent to rob that person.").
130

131

"' MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES

§ 5.01,

at 316 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised

Comments 1985).
135 Id.

136 Id. § 5.01, at 316 n.88.
"' Id. (italics added).
138 Cf DRESSLER, supra note 4,

§ 27.07, at 401 (discussing that a misguided agent "may later commit
some other irrational and dangerous act, or... come upon a more sensible way to accomplish her criminal
task").
"' See, e.g., Westen, supra note 4, at 535-36.
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140
position that impossibility is no longer a defense to a charge of attempt. As
a clear and high example of a stillborn attempt, these cases of
"incantations"141 are deployed by courts and commentators to demonstrate
"some validity to decisions that distinguish the tree stump from the empty
144
43
pocket case." 42 Accordingly, exertions that are "inapt" or "doomed" "eX
7
4
feature of an
ante"' 45 _-where failure is an "intrinsic"1 46 or "inherent"
48 criminal design that is too unlikely in a causation-sense to
"unreasonable"l
amount to muchl 4 9-are feeble gestures, not criminal attempts. The method
by which this exemption from the law of attempt is explicated, however,
devolves too often into whacky,iso admittedly "ridiculous"' hypotheticals,
which, while entertaining to a point, cut us off from our principal job of
decoding what was done: from the factual background of the incident or the
why of it all.
Why hypotheticals (Sanford Kadish's "Mr. Law and Mr. Fact" comes to
mind)' 52 are substituted for the abundant real-life criminal cases on hand is
opaque. The stick-figure nature of the hypotheticals boils things down sure
enough, but the upshot of this activity does more harm than good by impeding

See Alexander, supra note 20, at 48 n.40 (collecting sources).
Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 685 (1994) (arguing against conviction when "the impossibility would be obvious to
any sane person ... or where the evidence of criminal intent is doubtful").
14

&

14o

142 Jerome Hall, CriminalAttempt-A Study of Foundationsof CriminalLiability, 49 YALE L.J. 789,

836 (1940).
"' FLETCHER, supranote 98, § 3.3, at 149-52 n.59 ("If the type of conduct would produce harm in the
long run, then the defendant's act is apt and a punishable attempt, even though it is impossible under the
circumstances.").
'" H.L.A. Hart, The House of Lords on Attempting the Impossible, I OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 149,
152 (1981), reprintedin ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 367, 372 (1983).
Shavell, supra note 91, at 451.
"o
14 John S. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on CriminalAttempts, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 962, 971-78
(1930) ("The three typical situations of intrinsic impossibility . . include that of an attempt at rape by a
man who is impotent, that of an attempted homicide with firearms which are mechanically incapable of
causing death, and that of an attempt at poisoning by the administration of a substance actually not
poisonous.").
147 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2), at 87 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); Douglas

Husak, Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on the "Transfer Principle," 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 399, 405

(2012) (describing reluctance to punish "inherent factual impossibility," such as in cases of attempting to
use magic to carry out a crime).
" Brodie, supra note 16, at 252-56.
.49 Levy, supra note 16, at 265-74.
ISO See e.g., State v. Logan, 656 P.2d 777, 779 (Kan. 1983) (posits "trying 'to sink a battleship with a
pop-gun"'); Levy, supra note 16, at 229 (posits attempting to violate Anti-Tongue-Sticking-Out law).
"' Kevin Cole, The Voodoo We Do: Harm, Impossibility, and the ReductionistImpulse, 5 J. CONTEMP.

LEGAL ISSUES 31, 53-54 (1994).
152 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 599 (7th

ed. 2001).
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assessments of whether a mistake has been made.' 53
Take, for example, Clarissa, a cheated-on spouse who, after enduring "the
final straw, ... stirs what she believes to be a spoonful of the arsenic she had
purchased for this eventuality into his coffee," only to realize "that she
mistakenly added sugar to his coffee, just as she does every morning."l54 As
an act of repentance, Clarissa then turns herself in, apparently as attempted

murderer.1 55

On that lean backstory, frankly, it is hard to have any reaction at all to
Clarissa. We are to take it as given that she "mistakenly" took sugar for
poison. But how? Any amateur student of the mind would conclude that
Clarissa did not want her husband dead (not, at least, by her own hand).
Imagine the trembling hands, racing mind, and complex of emotions leading
up to the contemplated act. If genuinely committed to doing him in, what
went wrong? Did someone switch the sugar and arsenic containers? Did
Clarissa have two identical containers side by side with no distinguishing
markings and then simply guess which was the deadly one? What kind of
murderer does that? No mistake occurs where no precautions are taken.' 56
That she would turn herself in manifests a justifiably guilty conscience, but
at the level of action she "was never on the thing at all."'5 7
John Hasnas finds this bare-bones hypothetical "apparently derived from"
State v. Clarissa,"' which he characterizes as a "classic illustrative .... case
. . . in which a slave attempted to poison her master with an innocuous
substance."' 5 9 George Fletcher concurs with that characterization. 16 0 In the
real case, the real Clarissa dropped two ounces of Jamestown (aka Jimson)
weed in the coffee of two "free white persons," one her "overseer" Nelson
Parsons, who consequently found himself "so near dying," but not dead.161
Due to an inartfully pled indictment and an inadmissible confession that
Parsons coerced from Clarissa, her capital conviction of "'attempt to poison'
a white person" was reversed.1 6 2

153 But cf LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 276-93 (1987) (presenting
a fourteen-page
hypothetical impossibility case, which includes separate appellate "opinions," about attempting to illegally
export an authentic "native" painting later discovered to be forged).
' Hasnas, supranote 11, at 2.
155 Id.
'"

Cf Lawrence Crocker, Justice in CriminalLiability: DecriminalizingHarmlessAttempts, 53 OHIO

ST. L.J. 1057, 1105 (1992) (posing a hypothetical in which a box of arsenic containing only sugar due to
error at the arsenic factory is used to attempt poisoning by way of a cup of tea).
1s7 AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 23 n.12.
.58 11 Ala. 57, 60-61 (1847).

5 Hasnas, supra note 11, at 2 n.1.

'" See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARv. L. REV. 469, 522 (1976).
161 Clarissa, 11 Ala. at 59-62.
162

See id. at 62 (ruling that deadly properties oflamestown weed are not so obvious
as to be the subject
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But this much is clear: Jamestown weed is no innocuous substance,
understood both then and now as deadly if administered in more than
medicinal doses.' 6 3 Clarissa might have made a mistake pure and simple in
the dosage, or maybe Parsons had a stocky constitution, but her efforts were
far from doomed ex ante, quite apart from whether Parsons had it coming to
him. In this respect, Clarissa's actual litigation gets us much closer than the
"classic" hypothetical version to discovery or agreement about both the basis
of her mistake (if mistake there be) and what to do about it.
V. CONCLUSION

Nothing is more central to the understanding of untoward human action
than the operation of mistakes. And nothing is more conventional than the
notion that mistakes may be unreasonable, even "extreme."64 Indeed,
Richard Singer wrote about "unreasonable mistakes" for eighty-four pages in
the Boston College Law Review, tracing their operation in law back to
Blackstone,'1 6 yet without pausing to consider whether all wrong beliefs,
whatever their foundation, can constitute mistakes. If I have succeeded at all
here, then I have made a case for the idea that they cannot. Because mistakes
are tied to the public observable world and not to the inner world of privacy
and psychology, they are by definition reasonable. When someone able to
take the right one takes the wrong one when trying to get it right, a mistake
occurs, which is to say terms like negligence and recklessness have no
specific application to what was done. Mistakes may either exculpate or
inculpate when competently pled. Delusions, oppositely, may have some
place in the law, but they bear no relation to the meaning and operation of
mistakes.
If we are any closer to discovery or agreement about the meaning and
operation of mistakes, then so too are we at once closer to discovery or
agreement about a tension between the punishment of excessive risk-taking
as opposed to harm-causing, that is, a tension between the role of luck and
desserts in ascriptions of responsibility. And these are serious matters.

ofjudicial notice).
163 See Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472, 483 (1870) (referring to Jamestown weed as "narcotic poison");
DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, 3 ATTORNEYS MEDICAL DESKBOOK

§ 36:6

(4th ed. 2016) (stating that properties

of Jamestown weed include "agitation, death, hallucinations, hypertension, seizures, tachycardia").
1 HALL, supra note 82, at 592.
6s Richard Singer, The Resurgence ofMens Rea: 11-Honest but ReasonableMistakes ofFact in Self

Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459 (1987).

